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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
W. P. ROGERS and MAGNA MINING 
COMPANY, a New Mexico Corpora-
tion, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
UNITED WESTERN M I N E R A L S 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8787 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs and respondents will be referred to as 
"respondents;" the defendant and appellant will be referred 
to as "appellant." 
The appellant's Statement of Facts is substantially 
accurate to the extent it has gone; however, appellant has 
understandably omitted any reference in its statement and 
exhibits to an amendment to the sale contract which is so 
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2 
controlling that it alone, we submit, justifies the decision 
of the Lower Court. 
We respectfully invite the Court's attention to the Ap-
pendix hereto (Exhibit I) where there appears a letter 
agreement admitted in the pleadings (R. 29) proposed by 
appellant and accepted by respondents by the terms of which 
the appellant requested and received a postponement of the 
commencement of the obligation to pay monthly install-
ments which obligation it now contends is non-existent.1 
While we submit that by the clear language of the 
original agreement appellant has unqualifiedly undertaken 
to pay the minimum monthly installments for which judg-
ment was taken in the Lower Court, this amended portion 
of the agreement gives strong additional support to the 
judgment, since it is fundamental that in the interpreta-
tion of a contract disputed as to its effect a practical con-
struction placed by the parties upon the agreement is the 
best evidence of their intent Hardinge Company vs. Eimco 
Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 266 P. 2d 494. Universal Sales Corp. 
vs. California Press Manufacturing Company, 128 P. 2d 
665, 20 c. 2d 751. 
We propose to show that the first integrated contract 
is susceptible of no other interpretation than that placed 
on it by the Lower Court without reference to this docu-
ment. The amendment is, however, a part of the agreement 
ISee next to last paragraph of letter agreement (Exhibit I). In para-
graph 3 of the original agree1nent (R. 4), the appellant undertook to 
commence the n1inilnum contract payments six 1nonths after date of 
the agreement (August 4, 1955) making the first installment due 
February 4, 1~56. The amendatory letter agreement extends this date 
to April 4, 1956. 
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in dispute and within its four corners and is to be consid-
ered whether or not the Court determines there is any am-
biguity. As appellant declared in its brief we admit and 
still insist that the contract is not ambiguous. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MO-
TION TO DISMISS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT IT 
WAS IMMATERIAL WHETHER OR NOT MIN-
ERALS OR ORES COULD BE PRODUCED 
FROM THE MINING CLAIMS. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT MADE PROPER FINDINGS, CON-
CLUSIONS, AND JUDGMENT. 
POINT IV. 
THE RESPONDENTS MADE A PROPER ELEC-
TION OF REMEDIES. 
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ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT ON POINTS I, II, AND III 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MO-
TION TO DISMISS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT IT 
WAS IMMATERIAL WHETHER OR NOT MIN-
ERALS OR ORES COULD BE PRODUCED 
FROM THE MINING CLAIMS. 
POINT Ill. 
THE COURT MADE PROPER FINDINGS, CON-
CLUSIONS, AND JUDGMENT. 
We agree that the contract must be analyzed in its 
entirety; that the Court cannot rewrite it; and that the 
contract must receive a reasonable interpretation. We are 
confident, however, that the parties indulged in none of 
the highly academic refinements of logic and grammar ex-
pressed in appellant's brief. 
We will attempt to show that the interpretation of the 
Lower Court gave effect to and harmonized all of the pro-
visions of the disputed agreement; that the contrary would 
be true should the appellant now prevail. We propose to 
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5 
divide the argument on these combined points into two 
parts: 1, the practical construction of the court below, and 
2, the impracticality of that appellant seeks. 
1. THE PRACTICAL C 0 N S T R U C T I 0 N 
PLACED ON THE AGREEMENT BY THE 
LOWER COURT: 
Read in its entirety and as written by the parties, the 
Trial Court attached to the sale contract its only reasonable 
interpretation by finding that the following were its salient 
provisions : 
A. This was a sale-as opposed to a lease-by which 
the appellant covenanted to buy and the respondents coven-
anted to sell the mining claims for a fixed and definite 
amount (R. 3, para. 2). 
B. That respondents did not-as no rational person 
would do-hazard the risks involved in guaranteeing the 
presence of a body of ore. 
C. That any reference to payments "out of produc-
tion" referred only to the rate of payment ; not the total 
amount. 
D. Most importantly, that the appellant had an un-
qualified obligation to produce-as distinguished from pros-
pect or operate-said claims in order to alter its obligation 
to pay $500.00 per month. 
The appellant in its brief has misstated the ruling of 
the Trial Court in asserting under Point III of its brief that 
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the Court made a finding that "performance of work in 
mining said claims" would not relieve appellant of the 
monthly obligation. The Court did not so order (R. 32). 
The appellant has done no "mining" but placed in evidence 
the fact that they had only explored or prospected the 
claims. They admitted that they had produced no ore (R. 
134). Throughout the contract, the language is that appel-
lant is obliged to pay $500.00 per month in lieu of mining 
and producing said claims. The verb "mine" means to "pro-
duce minerals" and is not synonymous with explore, de-
velop, prospect, or expend money upon, mining claims. The 
word "mining" contemplates the extracting of valuable 
minerals. Nephi Company vs. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 
93 P. 53. See also American Mining Law, 4th Edition, Vol. 
1, page 27 and note 181. _ 
The parties clearly contemplated this situation: 
1. Ore may or may not be present. 
2. If it is present and is diligently and continuously 
mined by appellant, then respondents would accept, against 
the total purchase price, 15 per cent of the gross value 
thereof whatever that should be. 
3. If there is no ore present, or if ore is present and 
appellant elects not to mine it, appellant is required to pay 
$500.00 a month to apply upon the contract balance. 
4. The parties expected that there might be ore pres-
ent. If there were, the seller would have been entitled to 
a more rapid payment of his obligation. 
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Under these circumstances, the proviso quoted by the 
appellant at page 9 of its brief: 
"* * * so that buyer shall have the· obliga-
tion of either continuously mining and operating 
said claims so long as ore or minerals can be pro-
duced therefrom in commercial quantities, or if it 
fails to do so, shall pay sellers the sum of $500.00 
each and every month in lieu of production. * * * ." 
assumes perfect reason: when appellant wasn't mining the 
claims, it would have to pay. If appellant were excused, as 
it now claims, by absence of ore, why would there have 
been added the sentence which appellant omitted to include 
ending the proviso which it quoted: 
"The sum of $500.00 per month so paid shall be 
credited upon the unpaid balance of the purchase 
price." 
for the reason that it would then be immaterial what bal-
ance remained since nothing would be due. 
Every contractual provision must be given some mean-
ing (Gates vs. Daines, 3 Utah 2d 95, 279 P. 2d 458) and 
this provision can have none if appellant's view is correct. 
5. The appellant, however, could mine and produce 
the claims, and the respondents, in the interest of early 
development and accelerated payment of the balance, would 
go along with actual mining activity in lieu of $500.00 per 
month, so long as ore could be produced from the claims in 
commercial quantities. The Seller (respondents) would not 
tolerate a sham "mining" operation to be continued upon 
the claims to reduce his monthly payment after it was de-
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termined that commercial quantities of ore could not be 
recovered. In this connection it is important to note that 
the respondents, when the mine was producing, would re-
ceive only 15% of the gross mineral production whether 
that were more or less than $500.00 per month (R. p. 4, 
para. 3 of the contract and R. p. 104 and page 9 of appel-
lant's brief as to agreed statement by counsel regarding 
this point) . Reading the proviso again : 
"The buyer at its option may pay $500.00 per 
month after six months from the date of this agree-
ment in lieu of working and mining said claims so 
that buyer shall have the obligation of either con-
tinuously mining and operating said claims so long 
as ore or minerals can be produced therefrom in 
commercial quantities, * * *" 
Thus giving Buyer the option to determine which it shall 
do only during that period within which commercial pro-
duction can be realized. 
This, we submit is the only reasonable interpretation 
of the agreement and the only one under which all the pro-
visions of the agreement can be harmonized and given 
effect. 
2. THE IMPRACTICALITY OF THE INTER-
PRETATION SOUGHT BY APPELLANT: 
The appellant contends that in order to prevail the 
respondents should have been required to plead and prove 
the existence of a body of commercial ore. Appellant is 
saying that the Seller, in order to recover the purchase price 
of the claims, must prove that he has sold the Buyer an ore 
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body sufficient in size and value to pay the full purchase 
price out of 15 per cent of its production. The minute 15% 
of production failed to satisfy the contract balances the 
obligation stops. If this view is adopted, what possible 
value can the provision for a minimum $500.00 monthly 
payment have? 
The appellant also is contending that the respondents, 
having conveyed and completely divested themselves of 
ownership of the claims/ are subject to condition upon 
recovery of the balance of the consideration which condi-
tion is wholly within the power of the appellant to fulfill 
or not to fulfill. In other words, would any reasonable per-
son convey title to mining claims, or any other property, 
with a balance remaining which was to be paid at a mini-
mum rate of $500.00 per month, but confer on Buyer abso-
lute control over the property with the provision that should 
it not see fit to make the property productive, the unpaid 
purchase price would be forgiven. This construction not 
only neutralizes all effect of the minimum provision for 
payment of $500.00 per month, it also militates against 
sound reason. 
The construction argued by the appellant would abro-
gate all of the following provisions of the agreement: 
1. The provision for a fixed, definite, considera-
tion. 
ii. That something be paid each and every month 
(either $500.00 or 15% of a bona-fide and 
producing mining operation). 
2Respondent conveyed the claims on acceptance of title ( R. 5, paras. 
7, 8, 9). 
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iii. That the Sellers may, at theilr option, either 
retake the claims or pursue any other remedy 
they may have at law (para. 10 of the agree-
ment) in event of buyer's default. 
iv. The provision for any payment further than 
the down payment, since thereafter the entire 
contract would, if interpreted as urged by ap-
pellant, become illusory, without mutuality of 
agreement, since nothing else would be re-
quired of appellant. In this connection see 
Ross vs. Producers Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
396, 295 P. 2d 339, holding: "Wherever pos-
sible, a contract should be so construed that 
there are mutually binding promises on each 
party. 
v. The provision that the contract is to effect a 
sale of the properties. 
v1. The provision that the Seller is to receive 
$500.00 per month under any circumstances. 
We respectfully submit that the contentions of appel-
lant fall squarely within the interdiction of Section 236 (a) 
of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law 
of Contracts which states : 
"An interpretation which gives a reasonable, 
lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations 
of intention is preferred to an interpretation which 
leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable, 
unlawful or of no effect." 
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POINT IV. 
THE RESPONDENTS MADE A PROPER ELEC-
TION OF REMEDIES. 
We fail to see in this action any issue regarding elec-
tion of remedies. 
At the time of the pre-trial the appellant demanded 
that the respondents elect which remedy they would pursue 
(R. 117). Considerable discussion followed and an election 
was made by plaintiffs (R. 124) to pursue the remedy 
which resulted in the award by the Court below. 
The Court allowed the election of the respondents and 
entered it into the pre-trial order (R. 31). 
We admit that an election was required at the time of 
pre-trial. The appellant seems to be saying that where 
inconsistent remedies are asked, the plaintiff cannot recover 
under either. This argument does not comport with Rule 
8 (e) (2) URCP allowing a pleader to state inconsistent 
claims for relief. 
The ruling of the Trial Court in its pre-trial order 
amounted to an amendment to the pleading by leave of the 
Court. Rule 16 ( 2) states : 
Hln any action, the court may in its discretion 
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before 
it for a conference to consider: * * * 
"(2) The necessity or desirability of amend-
ments to the pleadings. * * *" 
We are confident the appellant is not serious in its 
contention that the respondents did not make a suitable 
election of remedies. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully contend that the Trial Court placed 
upon the agreement the only reasonable and rational inter-
pretation it is susceptible of receiving; that every provision 
was given meaning to effect harmony with every other 
provision, and that the Court properly ordered at conclu-
sion of the pre-trial that respondents were entitled to pur-
sue the remedy on which the Court awarded judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
and Respondents. 
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APPENDIX 
EXHIBIT I 
UNITED WESTERN MINERALS COMPANY 
136 West Palace Ave. 
Santa Fe, New Mexico 
November 2, 1955 
Mr. W. P. Rogers and Magna Mining Company 
Farmington, New Mexico 
Gentlemen: 
We have today accepted the title to the federal mining 
claims designated as Coleman Canyon group and Phoebe 
group, situate in Garfield County, Utah. The terms of the 
agreement, dated August 4, 1955, call for the following con-
sideration payable by United Western Minerals Company, 
in addition to the amount of $125,000 to be paid out of 15% 
of the gross mineral production from the Coleman Canyon 
group of claims. 
The consideration of the Coleman Canyon group, in 
addition to the above mentioned payment out of mineral 
production, is $15,000 in cash and $15,000 in cash or com-
mon stock of our company, valued at $1.00 per share. 
The consideration for the Phoebe group is $6,300, pay-
able in cash or common stock of our Company, valued at 
$1.00 per share. 
We have elected to pay $15,000 in cash, and $21,300 
in common stock, that is 21,300 shares of our common stock. 
We have heretofore deposited $3,000 with the First 
National Bank as escrow agent. This amount of $3,000 
will be released to you by our Company. 
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There remains a cash balance of $12,000 payable to 
you by United Western Minerals Company. The balance of 
$12,000 will be paid in the following manner, $2,000 by our 
check, $5,000 within thirty days and $5,000 within sixty 
days from the date of this letter. 
The release of the escrow deposit of $3,000, the pay-
ment of $2,000, and the issuance of 21,300 shares of com-
mon stock will be made upon delivery to our Company of 
satisfactory mining deeds to the Coleman Canyon group 
and the Phoebe group of claims. 
The date for the beginning of payments out of gross 
mineral production, provided for in clause 3 of the Agree-
ment of August 4, 1955, will be postponed until April 4, 
1956. 
Kindly signify your approval of the foregoing terms 
for payment of the consideration payable under the Agree-
ment of August 4, 1955, by signing the endorsement at the 
foot of this letter. 
AASjar 
APPROVED: 
jsj W. P. Rogers 
W. P. Rogers 
Sincerely yours, 
jsj Alva A. Simpson, Jr. 
ALVA A. SIMPSON, JR. 
President 
MAGNA MINING CO. 
By: /s/ W. P. Rogers 
Gen. Mgr. 
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